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THE PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATION TO RAISE
FRIVOLOUS ISSUES IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
Monroe H. Freedman*
[T]he law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in
determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of
the law's ambiguities andpotentialfor change.
[A] lawyer must with courage and foresight be able and ready to
shape the
body of the law to the ever-changing relationships of
2
society.
I have acquired new wisdom ...

or, to put it more critically, have

discardedold ignorance.3

Lawyers are generally familiar with the ethical rule forbidding
frivolous arguments,4 principally because of sanctions imposed under
rules of civil procedure for making such arguments. 5 Not all lawyers are
aware, however, of two ways in which the prohibitions of frivolous
arguments are restricted in both the rules themselves and in their
enforcement. First, the ethical rules have express limitations with respect
to arguments made on behalf of criminal defendants, 6 and courts are

*

Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School.

1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
PREAMBLE (1986) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
3. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 611 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining in a death
penalty case why he concurred in overruling a case that the Court had decided twelve years before).
4. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 3.1 (2002); MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7102(A)(2), EC 7-4; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW OF GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 (2000)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
5. See e.g., FED R. Civ P. 11; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2003) (applying to all
proceedings); FED R. APP. P. 38 (applying to all appeals); see generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH,
SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2003).
6. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 3.1 cmt. 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 110,
cmt. f.
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generally loath to sanction criminal defense lawyers.7 Second, the term
"frivolous" is narrowed, even in civil cases, by the way it is defined and
explained in the ethical rules and in court decisions.
I.

THE RARITY OF SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTS IN
CRIMINAL CASES

Criminal defense lawyers are rarely disciplined or otherwise
sanctioned for asserting frivolous positions in advocacy.8 One reason is
that criminal defense is different from other types of advocacy. As stated
in the comment to Model Rule 3.1, which relates to frivolous arguments:
The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or
state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to
the assistance of counsel in presenting a9 claim or contention that
otherwise would be prohibitedby this Rule.

Also, a comment in the Restatement of the Law Goveming Lawyers
notes that while the section on frivolous arguments applies "generally"
to criminal defense lawyers, they may nevertheless take "any step" that
is either "required or permitted" by the constitutional guarantee of the
effective assistance of counsel. 0
Illustrating the rare cases in which criminal defense counsel have
been sanctioned, the Restatement 1" cites In re Becraft.12 There, the Ninth
Circuit imposed a sanction against a lawyer in a criminal appeal who had
repeatedly raised an argument that the court characterized as a "patent
absurdity" and that the Eleventh Circuit had previously found to be
"'utterly without merit.,,' 13 Even in such a case, however, the Becraft
court emphasized its reluctance to sanction a criminal defense lawyer:

7. See infra notes 8-15.
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, §*110, reporter's note to cmt. f ("Advocacy in a
criminal-defense representation"); see also In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting
"the absence of authority imposing sanctions against defense counsel").
9. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 3.1, cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 4, § 110, cmt. f.
11. See id. at reporter's note to cmt. f.
12. 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989).
13. Id. at 548-49. In a number of tax evasion cases, Becraft had unsuccessfully contended that
the Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize a direct non-apportioned income tax on resident
United States citizens, and thus the federal income tax laws are unconstitutional with respect to such
citizens. Id. at 548. It is difficult to contemplate the national chaos that would follow a decision that
the collection of income taxes from resident citizens is unconstitutional, and that it has been so for
almost a century.
Becraft had also argued that state citizens are not subject to federal jurisdiction on the
ground that federal authority is limited to the United States territories and the District of Columbia,
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[W]e are hesitant to exercise our power to sanction under Rule 38
against criminal defendants and their counsel. With respect to counsel,
such reluctance, as evidenced by the absence of authority imposing
sanctions against defense counsel, primarily stems from our concern
that the threat of sanctions may chill a defense counsel's willingness to
advance novel positions of first impression. Our constitutionally
mandated adversary system of criminal justice cannot function
properly unless defense counsel feels at liberty to press all claims that
could conceivably invalidate his client's conviction. Indeed, whether
or not the prosecution's case is forced to survive the "crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing" may often depend upon defense
counsel's willingness and ability to press forward with a claim of first
impression.14
The court added that because significant deprivation of liberty is often at
stake in a criminal prosecution, "courts generally tolerate arguments on
behalf of criminal defendants that would likely be met with sanctions if
'5
advanced in a civil proceeding."'
II.

SANCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES UNDER RULE 11 AND SIMILAR RULES

During the decade after the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a dangerous tendency developed to
impose severe sanctions against lawyers under various federal and state
rules. 16 This excessive use of sanctions for allegedly frivolous filings
prior to the 1993 amendment of Rule 11 has left a misleadingly broad
impression of the meaning of "frivolous."
Rule 11 is similar to the ethical codes (discussed below) in
permitting a claim or defense that is "warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law.' 17 Giving added emphasis
to the italicized language, the Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1983
version of Rule 11 cautioned that the rule is "not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories."' 8 Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that creativity has
been chilled by sanctions under Rule 11. In addition, judicial

an argument that makes one wonder how prescient Becraft was with respect to the Rehnquist
Court's views on federalism. See id. at 549.
14. Id. at 550 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; FED. R. APP. P. 38, 46; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1927 (2003).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. II (emphasis added).
18. 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
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enforcement of the rule has had a disproportionate impact on plaintiffs'
attorneys in civil rights cases, impaired lawyer-client confidentiality, and
has been the cause of serious conflicts of interest between lawyers and
clients.19

In an important article, Rule 11 in the Real World, Mark Stein
explained, from his experience as a litigator, that lawyers are most
inclined to threaten sanctions when an adversary's position is "not
frivolous, but [rather, when it] is simultaneously dangerous and
vulnerable." 20 That is, the unwarranted charge that an argument is
frivolous has been used to distract the court from the merits of the
argument. Moreover, even if the adversary lawyer is aware that his
position is meritorious, "he may still be cowed by the threat of sanctions
because of the unpredictable way in which courts award them.'
In response to broad criticism of the 1983 version of Rule 11, the
rule was amended in 1993.22 Since then, the volume of cases involving
charges of frivolous filings has been substantially reduced. However, the
reason for that decrease is not clear. One reason could be that the
amendment made imposition of sanctions discretionary with the judge,
rather than mandatory. Another possible reason is that a motion for
sanctions can no longer be simply an afterthought to another motion
(e.g., a motion for summary judgment), but must be made and supported

19.

See JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., SANCTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

11 (1996); JOSEPH, supra note 5; Developments in the Law--Lawyers' Responsibilities and
Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1642, n.645 (more than twenty percent of lawyers

interviewed "did not assert a potentially meritorious claim"); George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road
to Amendment, 61 MISS. L.J. 5 (1991); Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, PreliminaryDraft of
ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedureand the FederalRules of Evidence,
137 F.R.D. 53, 64 (1991); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Santions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting
Misapplication of Rule II by Harmoniziang It with Pre-Verdict Dismisal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 257, 259 (1991) (Rule II "discouraged innovative lawyering"); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11:
Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 483-86(1991) (Rule I I is
being used to chill plaintiffs' access to courts); STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION:
THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
(1989); Paul Rothstein & Richard Wolfe, Innovative Attorneys Starting to Feel Chillfrom New Rule
11, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 23, 1978, at 18; Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule
lI -Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment," 74 GEO.
L.J. 1313 (1986); THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE II SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988).

20. Mark S. Stein, Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the
Purpose of Imposing Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132
F.R.D. 309, 313 (1990). Another lawyer has commented that sanctions aren't needed for claims that
are truly frivolous, because "there has always been a sanction for frivolous claims, it's calledlosing." Another lawyer has observed that "good judges don't need Rule 11,and bad judges
shouldn't have it." (quoted from conference attended by author).
21. Id.
22. See Joseph, supranote 5, at21-34.
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in a separate pleading. Also, the 1993 Rule 11 has a "safe harbor"
provision under which a lawyer whose filing is challenged as frivolous
has twenty-one days to withdraw the filing without sanction. In one
respect, this "safe-harbor" can be a potent threat, coercing withdrawal of
arguments that Stein characterizes as "not frivolous, but...
simultaneously dangerous and vulnerable. 2 3 A positive effect of the
"safe-harbor" amendment, however, is that a motion for sanctions
cannot be filed at the end of litigation, because at that point it is no
longer possible to make use of the "safe-harbor" withdrawal.
There is still reason for concern, therefore, that Rule 11, and similar
rules in state courts, are continuing to have a deleterious effect on
creative lawyering in civil cases. This is so in part because of the abuse
of the rule by some judges, especially prior to the 1993 amendments, and
because of the continuing in terrorem effect of possible sanctions under
Rule 11 and similar rules. Nevertheless, the reduction in Rule 11
sanctions in federal courts since 1993 is a salutary development.
III.

DEFINING "FRIVOLOUS"

Despite the earlier abuses under Rule 11 and similar rules, the
definition of "frivolous" has been an extremely narrow one. The
traditional legal definition of frivolous is "obviously false on the face of
the pleading," as when something was pleaded that "conflicted with a
judicially noticeable fact or was logically impossible, such as a plea of
judgment recovered before the accrual of the cause of action. 24 Surely,
a lawyer could properly be subjected to sanctions for filing a pleading
that is frivolous in the sense of being "obviously false on [its] face."
Moreover, lawyers can properly be punished for filing or maintaining
pleadings that are "sham" or "baseless," that is, those that appear to state
proper claims or defenses, but that are known to the lawyer to be false in
25
fact.
The Supreme Court has gone somewhat further, by unanimously
defining a "frivolous" claim as one based on an "indisputably meritless"
or "outlandish" legal theory, or one whose "factual contentions are
clearly baseless," such as a claim describing "fantastic or delusional
scenarios. 2 6 Elaborating on that definition, the Court held that
23. Stein, supra note 20, at 313.
24. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some 'Striking' Problems
with FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1976).
25. See id. at 26-29.
26. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-30 (1989) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1948)).
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frivolousness can be found when the facts
alleged "rise to the level of
27
the irrational or the wholly incredible."
In addition to establishing this highly restrictive definition, the
Supreme Court has cautioned judges against finding arguments to be
frivolous. "Some improbable allegations might properly be disposed of
on summary judgment," the Court explained, "but to dismiss them as
frivolous without any factual development is to disregard the age-old
insight that many allegations might be
'strange, but true; for truth is
28
fiction.'
than
Stranger
strange,
always
Nevertheless, some judges have tended to ignore that guidance, and
have imposed sanctions against lawyers who file pleadings or make
arguments that have proven to be unavailing. When that happens,
zealous advocacy is not the only value that is placed at risk. The genius
of our common law is also jeopardized.
For example, Justice Cardozo noted that nine out of ten, and
perhaps even more, of the cases taken to the New York Court of Appeals
during his time on that bench were "predetermined," their fate
"preestablished" by "inevitable laws" from the moment of their filing.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 29 appears to be a perfect example. In
1908, the Court of Appeals of New York had reaffirmed the longestablished rule that a consumer cannot recover against the manufacturer
of a product for negligence. 30 Not long thereafter, MacPherson, who had
been injured while driving a car with a defective wheel, sued the Buick
Motor Company for negligent manufacture. Surely, MacPherson's case
was one of those that Cardozo called "predetermined.", 3 1 The result of
MacPherson's appeal, however, was Cardozo's most celebrated torts
opinion, reversing long-established law by allowing a consumer to sue a
manufacturer for a defective product, and demonstrating the creative
common-law judging for which he has been so highly regarded.32
As Professor Grant Gilmore observed, the MacPherson decision
"imposed liability on [a defendant] who would almost certainly [] not
have been liable if anyone but Cardozo had been stating and analyzing

27.
28.
Steffand,
29.
30.
31.
(1915).
32.

Denton v. Hemandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Id. (quoting LORD BYRON, DON JUAN, CANTO XIV, stanza 101 (Truman Steffan, Esther
& Willis Pratt eds., 1977)).
217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
See Torgesen v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956, 1000 (1908).
The point is underscored by Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801, 803
See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 120 (2003).
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the prior case law."33 At the time of filing the complaint, however,
MacPherson's lawyer could not have known that Cardozo would choose
to reverse a century of unbroken precedent that had only recently been
reaffirmed. Much less could he have known that Cardozo would be able
to carry a majority of the court with him. Without that frivolousappearing complaint, however, Cardozo could not have changed the
common law of manufacturer's liability as he did.
Even Cardozo, the great innovator, observed that "the range of free
activity [for judges] is relatively small, ' '34 in part because judges are
limited to the issues that are brought before them by counsel. Behind
every innovative judge, therefore, is a lawyer whose creative (and,
arguably, frivolous) litigating opened up that small range of judicial
opportunity, thereby making the precedent-shattering decision possible.
Innovative judging (and lawyering) is not restricted to common law
cases. Depending on how one counts the cases, the Supreme Court has
overruled its own decisions 200 to more than 300 times. On at least
sixteen occasions, this has happened within three years.3 5 At other times,
the most venerable of precedents have fallen, including at least ten cases
that were overruled after as many as 94 to 126 years.36 For example, in
33. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 135 (1977), quoted in WHITE, supra
note 32, at 120 (1980).
34. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924).
35. See Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. 241 (1808), overruled by, Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. 281
(1810); Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Prescott, 83 U.S. 603 (1873), overruled by Railway Co. v. McShane,
89 U.S. 444 (1874); Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569 (1875), overruled by County of Cass v.
Johnston, 95 U.S. 360 (1877); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated by 319 U.S. 103
(1943); Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of
Educators v. Bametter, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707
(1946), overruled by Cosmopolitian Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949); Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);
Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), overruled by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Ladner
v. United States, 355 U.S. 282 (1958), overruled by Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958);
Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), overruled by Swift v. Wickham, 382 U.S. I 11
(1965); State Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. of Fla. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), overruled by
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Sterett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 408 U.S.
809 (1972), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), overruled by Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Bonelli Cattle v. Arizona, 414 U.S.
313 (1973), overruled by Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978);
South Carolina.v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Pervis Tyrone Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
36. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938); Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170 (1854), overruled by United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1887), overruled by
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs 120 U.S. 390 (1887),
overruled in part by Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Coffey v. United
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Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 37 the Supreme Court overruled a precedent
that had been applied every day in every federal trial court for nearly a
century. 38 On the occasion of one about-face by the Court, Justice
Roberts protested that "[n]ot a fact differentiates [the overruled case]
from this [one] except the names of the parties. 39 Indeed, the majority
itself acknowledge in that case, "The District Court denied the relief
sought and the Circuit Court of Appeals quite properly affirmed its
action on the authority40 of Grovey v. Townsend," which the Court then
proceeded to overrule.
The Rehnquist Court has overruled prior authority in over forty
cases. 4' Most recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,4 z the Court struck down
state legislation outlawing private, consensual, homosexual conduct. In
doing so, the Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,4 3 decided seventeen
years before. In Bowers, a majority of the Court had described the legal
argument that ultimately prevailed in Lawrence as "at best, facetious.""
Since the dictionary definition of "facetious" is "not meant to be taken
seriously or literally ... 45 the Court was characterizing that argument
in a way that was perhaps even more pejorative than the word
"frivolous."
With specific reference to death penalty cases, the Rehnquist Court
has overruled itself twice in relatively short periods of time. In Atkins v.
Virginia,46 holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of
a mentally retarded person, the Court overturned Penry v. Lynaugh,47
decided thirteen years before. In the same term, the Court held in Ring v.
Arizona,48 that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge,
States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886); ExParte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), overruled in part by United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (1985); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1861), overruled by Puerto Rico v.

Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), overruled by Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
37.
38.

See 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
See generally Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).

39. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), citing Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1944).
40. See id. at 652.
41.

See THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA:

ANALYSIS AND

INTERPRETATION 2245-56 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996); id. at 171 (2000
Supp.); L. EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 194-206 (3d ed. 2003); Major

Decisions of the Court, 1790-2002: Congressional Quarterly 87-141.
42. See 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
43. See478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44. Id. at 194.
45. WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Random House 1991).
46. See 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
47. See 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
48. See 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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make the finding of any fact on which the death penalty depends; in
doing so, the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona,49 decided twelve years
before. In Ring, the Court candidly acknowledged that "[o]ur precedents
are not sacrosanct., 50 As explained by Justice Scalia, concurring in Ring,
"I have acquired new wisdom.., or, to put it more critically, have
discarded old ignorance." 5'
Recognizing how creative lawyering can dispel "old ignorance"
and impart "new wisdom" to judges, the American Bar Association has
taken care in its ethical rules not to discourage lawyers from challenging
established precedent or otherwise seeking to make new law on behalf of
their clients. For example, Model Rule 3.1 provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis in law and in fact for doing so that is not
frivolous." 52 Under such a rule, of course, MacPherson's lawyer would
be subject to professional discipline, along with countless other lawyers
whose creative litigating helped to shape our law. However, a contention
is not frivolous within the rule if it is made as "a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law., 53 Also, the
54
Comment notes that "the law is not always clear and never is static."
Accordingly, "in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account
55
must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.
Moreover, filing an action or defense is not frivolous under the Model
Rules "even though the lawyer believes that the client's position
ultimately will not prevail., 56 Model Rule 3.1 does say expressly that in
criminal cases the defense can always put the prosecution to its proof.
This is worth reiterating, although we are not aware that there has ever
been any confusion about the point under the Model Code.

49. See 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
50. 536 U.S. at 608.
51. Id. at 611.
52.

MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 3.1.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. A related provision in the Model Code is DR 7-102(A)(1). In the Model Rules, the Model
Code Comparison to MR 3.1 suggests that there are three noteworthy differences between MR 3.1
and DR 7-102(A)(1). However, these differences do not appear to be significant. Conduct is
improper under DR 7-102(A)(1) if the purpose is "merely" to harass or maliciously injure another.
Under MR 3.1 there must be "a" basis that is not frivolous (and frivolous is defined the same as
under the Model Code), but if there is a non-frivolous basis, then there is ground for a good faith
argument, and if there is ground for a good faith argument, then the purpose is not merely to harass
or injure another. The comparison also says that the test under MR 3.1, unlike DR 7-102(A)(1), is
an objective one. However, DR 7-102(A)(1) applies if the lawyer "knows or when it is obvious"
that the litigation is frivolous. The emphasized language is an objective standard.
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Similarly, DR 7-102(A)(2) of the Model Code begins by forbidding
a lawyer to "[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law.",57 Again, however, the exception to the rule is
crucial: the lawyer is permitted to advance a claim that is unwarranted
under existing law "if it can be supported by good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." 58 EC 7-4 adds that
"a lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is
frivolous." 59 The same Ethical Consideration says, however, that the
advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law that is
favorable to his client "without regard to his professional 6opinion
as to
0
the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail.,
Further, if the advocate has doubts about the bounds of the law, she
should resolve them in favor of the client's interests. 6 1 Thus, a lawyer
contemplating a novel legal argument, or even one that has been rejected
by the court in previous litigation, can nevertheless act ethically in
presenting that argument despite her own professional opinion that the
argument will be rejected. In other words, a lawyer can make an
argument in "good faith" under DR 7-102(A)(2) even if the lawyer has
no faith that the argument will prevail.
Thus, the Model Code encourages the litigating lawyer to foster
growth and change in the law, urging the lawyer, "with courage and
foresight," to be "able and ready to shape
the body of the law to the
62
society.,
of
relationships
ever-changing
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers has almost
identical language to the Model Rules and Model Code.63 In addition,
the comment to Section 110 urges judges to exercise restraint in
disciplining
lawyers
for frivolous
advocacy,
noting
that
"[a]dministration and interpretation of prohibitions against frivolous
litigation should be tempered by concern to avoid overenforcement." 64
Moreover, judges who have imposed sanctions against lawyers
have typically ignored the constitutional limitations on sanctioning
57.

MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A)(2).

58.

Id.

59.

Id. EC 7-4.

60. Id.
61. See id. EC 7-3. In counseling a client, however, the lawyer should be candid regarding the
probable outcome of the issue in litigation. See id.
62. Id. at PREAMBLE.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 4, § 110 (1) ("A lawyer may not bring or defend a
proceeding or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.").
64. Id. at cmt. b.
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lawyers for filing frivolous pleadings. 65 As the Supreme Court has
reiterated in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc.,66 there is a First Amendment right to petition
for redress of grievances by litigating civil cases. That right has, of
course, been severely chilled by sanctions intended to discourage
litigation.
A "sham" lawsuit is an exception to the constitutional right to
petition through the courts. However, the "sham" exception does not
apply unless the suit is "objectively baseless" or "objectively
meritless. 67 To satisfy that test, the litigation must be "so baseless that
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect to secure favorable
relief."68 All that is necessary to establish the constitutional right is an
objective "chance" that a claim "may" be held valid.69 In that event, the
First Amendment right is secure, even if the litigant has no subjective
expectation of success and has a malicious motive for pursuing the
claim.7 °
IV.

THE NECESSITY TO MAKE "FRIVOLOUS" ARGUMENTS IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES

As we have seen, even in civil cases, lawyers have considerable
range, both ethically and constitutionally, in raising issues that are
arguably frivolous. With respect to criminal. defense, moreover, courts
are loath to impose sanctions 7 1against lawyers in any case in which the
defendant's liberty is at stake.
Furthermore, as serious as is loss of liberty, our jurisprudence
recognizes that death is different. 72 This is so not only as a fact of life
and death, but also for the practical reason that appellate and postconviction remedies are pursued in almost 100% of cases in which the
death penalty is imposed.73 It is therefore crucial that in any capital case,
65. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983).
66. See 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
67. Id. at 60.
68. Id. at 62.
69. Id. at 62-63.
70. See id. at 57.
71. See In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1989).
72. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); see also Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., disapproving but recognizing the Court's "death-is-different
jurisprudence").
73. See ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, GUIDELINE 10.8 (rev. ed. 2003).
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"any and all conceivable errors" be preserved for review. 74 The
alternative is that a client may be put to death by the state, despite
reversible error, because counsel has waived the issue or defaulted on it.
An example is Smith v. Kemp. 75 This was one of two prosecutions
for the same murder. In the case involving co-defendant Machetti, who
was the "mastermind" in the crime,76 the lawyers timely raised the issue
that women had been unconstitutionally under-represented in the jury
pool.77 As a result, Machetti's conviction and death sentence were
78
overturned, resulting in a new trial and a sentence of life in prison. Codefendant John Eldon Smith was tried in the same county, by a jury
drawn from the same jury pool. However, Smith's lawyers did not
timely raise the constitutional issue, because they had overlooked
authority that gave support to the argument.79 Since his lawyers' failure
to raise the issue was not adequate to overcome non-constitutional
reasons of comity, finality, and agency, Smith was electrocuted.
The agency issue is an essential part of the jurisprudence of death.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, expressly relied
upon the Restatement of Agency Section 242, for the "well-settled
principle of agency law" that a master is subject to liability for harm
caused by the negligent conduct of a servant within the scope of the
employment. 80 Thus, the Court could "discern no inequity" in requiring
81
a criminal defendant ("the master") to "bear the risk of attorney error."
The error in that case was that the attorney ("the servant") was 72 hours
late in filing a "purely ministerial" notice of appeal in the state court.82
Accordingly, Roger Coleman was precluded from raising eleven
constitutional challenges to his conviction, and he too was put to death
by the state.83
74. Id. at GUIDELINE 10.8, commentary (quoting Steven B. Bright, Preserving Error at
Capital Trials, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1997, at 42-43).
75. See 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (1983).
76. Id.at 1476 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. See id.
78. See id.
(Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. See id.at 1470-71 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357 (1979)).
80. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
81. Id.at754.
82. Id. at 742.
83. Justice O'Connor also relied on federalism to support her opinion. Indeed, the first words
of her opinion in a case involving whether a person will live or die are: "This is a case about
federalism." Id. at 726. But see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)
(where Justice O'Connor chose to ignore the federalism issue (raised by her dissenting colleagues)
to allow a cause of action for sexist harassment of a schoolgirl, an important issue, but not one as
compelling as death by electrocution).
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A similar problem arises when a lawyer makes the tactical decision
to omit an argument that appears to be weak (or when a lawyer claims to
have done so when challenged with ineffective assistance of counsel).
An illustration of that is Smith v. Murray.84 There the lawyer chose to
forgo an argument that was contrary to an opinion that the Virginia
Supreme Court had handed down only two years before. Writing for the
United States Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor praised the lawyer for
"winnowing out" the weak argument and focusing on those more likely
to prevail, and lauded this practice as the "hallmark of effective appellate
85
advocacy."
As a result of this model of effective appellate advocacy in the state
court, however, the client was precluded from raising a winning
constitutional issue in the federal courts. 86 As Justice O'Connor held, the
lawyer's "deliberate, tactical decision" to winnow out what appeared to
him to have been a weak argument in the state appeal, made it "selfevident" that the client had87lost the right to raise the issue on habeas
corpus in the federal courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion is therefore clear. Counsel in a capital case must, as
a matter of professional responsibility, raise every issue at every level of
the proceedings that might conceivably persuade even one judge in an
appeals court or in the Supreme Court, in direct appeal or in a collateral
attack on a conviction or sentence. This is the essence of the ABA's
Guideline 10.8 in its new Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (February,
2003). In addition, as noted in the commentary to Guideline
10.8(A)(3)(d), assertion of a claim (even a "frivolous" one) might
increase the chances of a desirable plea agreement or might favorably

84. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
85. Id. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)). This position is not
universally accepted. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Briefing and Arguing FederalAppeals, by
Federick Bernays Wiener, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 146 (1961) (book review) (arguing that effective
advocacy requires that the lawyer raise every issue that might conceivably attract even one vote on a
multi-judge panel).
86. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, FREEDMAN & SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 136-37 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1981)).
87. Jones, 463 U.S. at 534. Justice O'Connor also noted "the profound societal costs that
attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction," but had nothing to say about the costs to society and to
the individual when a hearing on a legitimate constitutional claim is denied in a death case. Id. at
539.
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influence a governor or other official in making a decision regarding
clemency.
In short, in a capital case, the lawyer for the accused has a
professional obligation to assert at every level
of the proceedings what
88
otherwise might be deemed a frivolous claim.

88. The same is true, of course, in any case involving potential deprivation of liberty in which
an appeal or collateral attack might be contemplated.
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